A Theory of Political Entrepreneurship

Matthew McCaffrey, Joseph T. Salerno

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DOI: 10.4236/me.2011.24061                

Abstract

This paper adapts the entrepreneurial theory developed by Richard Cantillon, Frank Knight, and Ludwig von Mises to the theory of “political entrepreneurship.” Political entrepreneurship is an outgrowth of the theory of the market entrepreneur, and derives from extending entrepreneurial theory from the market into the political sphere of action. By applying the theory of the entrepreneur to political behavior, we provide a basis for identifying political entrepreneurs, and for separating them analytically from other government agents. The essence of political entrepreneurship is the redirection of production from the path it would have taken in an unregulated market. Nevertheless, this production does produce an income stream to political entrepreneurs which closely resembles the profit of market entrepreneurs.

Keywords

Entrepreneurship, Political Entrepreneurship, Ownership, Production, Uncertainty, Income Distribution, Profit and Loss

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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