Pretense Theory and the Imported Background

Jeffrey Goodman

.

DOI: 10.4236/ojpp.2011.11004                

Abstract

Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument–one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions–for the falsity of the pretense theory.

Keywords

Fiction, Truth in Fiction, Pretense, Make-Believe

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

References

[1]	Byrne, A. (1993). Truth in fiction: The story continued. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71, 24-35. doi:10.1080/00048409312345022
[2]	Crimmins, M. (1998). Hesperus and phosphorous: Sense, pre-tense, and reference. The Philosophical Review, 107, 1-48. doi:10.2307/2998314
[3]	Currie, G. (1990). The nature of fiction. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
[4]	Kim, S., & Maslen, C. (2006). Counterfactuals as short stories. Philosophical Studies, 129, 81-117. doi:10.1007/s11098-005-3022-x
[5]	Kroon, F. (2000). Negative existentials. In A. Everett and T. Hofweber (Eds.), Empty names, fiction and the puzzles of non-existence (pp. 95-116). Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications.
[6]	Lewis, D. (1983). Truth in fiction. Philosophical papers, 1 (pp. 261- 275). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/0195032047.003.0015
[7]	Priest, G. (1987). In contradiction. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. (2nd expanded ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
[8]	Richard, M. (2000). Semantic pretense. In A. Everett and T. Hofweber (Eds.), Empty Names, fiction and the puzzles of non-existence (pp. 205-232). Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications.
[9]	Walton, K. (1990). Mimesis as make-believe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.