Open Journal of Philosophy
2012. Vol.2, No.1, 38-44
Published Online February 2012 in SciRes (http://www.SciRP.org/journal/ojpp) http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojpp.2012.21006
38
Rainbows, Time Zones, and Other Mind-Dependent Objects:
Making Sense of the Relevant Notions of “Mind-Dependence”
in the Debate between Metaphysical Realists and Antirealists
Deborah C. Smith
Kent State University, Kent, USA
Received November 9th, 2011; revi sed December 14th, 2011; accepted December 21st, 2011
In a recent article, Sam Page distinguishes four kinds of mind-(in)dependence: ontological, causal, struc-
tural, and individuative. He argues that, despite the fact that the metaphysical realism/antirealism debate
has been frequently characterized as a debate between those who accept and those who deny that the
world is causally and/or structurally dependent on minds, many antirealists are primarily interested in de-
fending the claim that the world is individuatively mind-dependent. In this article, I critically examine
these differing senses of “mind-dependence” highlighting ways in which they remain ambiguous and
identifying various entailment relations between them. I argue that there is reason to believe that onto-
logical dependence, structural dependence, and the only sort of individuative dependence that is relevant
to the metaphysical debate are coextensive notions. As such, any argument that succeeds in establishing
that it is incoherent to suppose that everything is ontologically and/or structurally dependent thereby es-
tablishes the incoherence of metaphysical antirealism.
Keywords: Realism; Antirealism; Mind-Dependence
Introduction
There seems to be little doubt that, since at least the middle
of the last century, there has been a lively debate (or rather a
family of lively debates) between proponents of views dubbed
“realism” and “antirealism” respectively revolving around the
question of whether or not a given set of objects, properties/
relations, facts, truths, etc. is significantly dependent on the
existence and activities of (human or other finite) minds. The
debate between mathematical realists and antirealists is plausi-
bly construed as a debate over whether mathematical objects,
properties or truths are somehow constructed (as opposed to
discovered) via our mathematical theories and the development
of mathematical proofs. The debate between sortal realists and
antirealists centers on the question of whether there are real
kinds in nature independent of our categorizing or sorting of
individuals into various kinds. Scientific realists and antirealists
debate about whether scientific laws hold or whether the unob-
servable entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist
independent of our scientific theorizing. In addition to these
localized realism/antirealism debates, there is the more global
metaphysical debate concerning whether or not there is any-
thing at all that is mind-independent. While it is clear that the
notion of mind-dependence plays an important role in these and
other realism/antirealism debates,1 the notion of mind-depend-
ence itself remains less than clear. This paper will examine the
various notions of mind-dependence that are germane to the
global debate between metaphysical realists and antirealists.
Mind-Dependence and the Debate between
Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism
In “Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth: Is Meta-
physical Antirealism Self-Refuting?” I defended a realist view
that I called modest metaphysical realism. As defined there,
modest metaphysical realism (hereafter simply “metaphysical
realism”) is the conjunction of two theses (Smith, 1999: p. 411):
1) The world does not depend on the existence or activities
of minds for its ontological status.
2) The world has some structure(s) that is(are) mind-inde-
pendent.
Denying either thesis yields a (near) global version of meta-
physical antirealism according to which any and all structure in
the world and/or the very ontological status of the world is
mind-dependent. In defense of metaphysical realism, I argued
that neither the ontological status nor all of the structure of
minds themselves could be mind-dependent (Smith, 1999: pp.
414-415).
Sam Page has suggested that my argument for metaphysical
realism misses the mark because I (and others) have failed to
appreciate the relevant sense of “mind-dependent” at issue in
the (or better, one significant) contemporary debate between
realists and antirealists (Page, 20 06: p. 327). Page himself disti n-
guishes four kinds of mind-(in)dependence: ontological, causal,
structural, and individuative. He argues that, despite the fact
that the contemporary realism/antirealism debate has been fre-
quently characterized as a debate between those who accept and
1A notable exception to the claim that any given realism/antirealism debate
trades on the question of mind-dependence is the debate between moral
realists and antirealists. It seems to me that the moral realist can and should
allow that moral properties, principles, or truths are dependent on the exis-
tence of rational, sentient creatures. If there were no creatures with minds,
the world wou ld plausibl y be a completely a moral place. In stead, the d ebate
over moral realism seems to trade on whether there are any universal or
objective moral truths, principles, or prescriptions.

D. C. SMITH
those who deny that the world2 is causally and/or structurally
dependent on human minds (Page, 2006: pp. 326-327), many
nota- ble antirealists (he cites Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam,
and Nelson Goodman) are primarily interested in defending the
claim that the world is individuatively dependent on us (Page,
2006: pp. 330-332).
While I’m inclined to stand by the cogency of my earlier ar-
gument as well as its relevance to the contemporary debate3
(whose opponents I will continue to call “metaphysical realists”
and “metaphysical antirealists” respectively), I agree with Page
that the crucial notion of mind-dependence is far from clear.
Indeed, the notion is sufficiently ambiguous that I have fre-
quently found myself disturbed by a sense that the metaphysical
realist and antirealist were merely talking past one another.
Even so, I’m inclined to believe that there is a meaningful de-
bate to be engaged in here and that additional work to disam-
biguate the relevant sense of “mind-dependence” is needed to
better articulate what is at issue—let alone make any head-
way—in that debate.
Disambiguating “Mind-Dependence”
In “Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth”, I sug-
gested that the claim that something X was mind-dependent
could be glossed by a counter-factual conditional of the fol-
lowing form: “X would not exist and have the features that it
does if there were no minds” (Smith, 1999: p. 416). An obvious
problem with this counter-factual gloss on the relevant sense of
“mind-dependence” is that when “X” is replaced by “minds”,
the result is an instance of the trivially true counter-factual form:
“X would not exist and have the features that it does if there
were no Xs”. It might prima facie appear that my case for
metaphysical realism is rendered incoherent. To address this
concern, I argued that there was an ambiguity in the claim that
minds are mind-dependent. I wrote:
Consider the following two claims:
1) Trees are mind-dependent entities. That is, a tree would
not exist and have the features that it does if there were no
minds.
2) Trees are tree-dependent entities. That is, a tree would not
exist and have the features that it does if there were no trees.
The first claim is a nontrivial claim about trees. …The sec-
ond claim is merely an instance of the trivial claim that nothing
of a kind K can exist and have the features that it does unless
there is at least one instance of a given kind K (namely it-
self) …As such, it is a trivial claim that no one would reject.
Now consider this third claim:
3) Minds are mind-dependent entities. That is, a mind would
not exist and have the features that it does if there were no
minds.
I want to suggest that this claim is ambiguous between an
utterly trivial reading á la 2) above and a nontrivial reading á la
1) above. The proponent of [metaphysical realism] can and
should accept c) on its trivial reading. It is the nontrivial read-
ing of 3) that a would-be opponent of [metaphysical realism] is
committed to accepting. And it is this nontrivial reading of 3)
that the proponent of [metaphysical realism] takes himself to
have shown to be incoherent…. (Smith, 1999: p. 416).
Recognizing the need to be more precise concerning what is
meant by “mind-dependence” and “mind-independence”, I sug-
gested that a fruitful first step would be to begin by examining
cases in which both the metaphysical realist and antirealist
would agree that an aspect of the world was significantly
mind-dependent (Smith, 1999: p. 418).
Consider, as one such putative example a rainbow. A rain-
bow has a definite stripy character. Although, for example,
yellow and green may blur a bit where they meet, there seems
to be a finite number of distinct stripes in a rainbow. But of
course, the ranges o f wavelengths of light… constitute a smoot h
spectrum; the light spectrum (visible as well as nonvisible)
possesses no distinct stripes. The stripes of the rainbow (and
perhaps the rainbow itself) are, it seems to me, a paradigm case
of aspects of the world that depend for their existence and
structure on perceivers, and hence, more generally on minds. …It
seems to me that such putative entities as time zones or hours
are mind-dependent in a way significantly different (and stronger)
from the stripes of a rainbow. Chairs and other artifacts are
mind-dependent in a still different (weaker) sense (Smith, 1999:
p. 418).
In “Metaphysical Antirealism and Objective Truth”, I was
able to do no more than provide the brief, thumbnail sketch
above of how an attempt to disambiguate the relevant sense of
“mind-dependent” might proceed. In many ways, Page’s article
takes up where my thumbnail sketch left off. Despite the fact
that Page makes considerable headway in the endeavor, I be-
lieve that there is much more work that needs to be done. In
what follows, I will critically examine the differing senses of
“mind-dependence” presented by Page highlighting ways in
which they remain ambiguous and identifying various entail-
ment relations between them. I will argue that three of the four
senses of “m ind-dependence” identified by Page yield co-extens ive
classes of mind-dependent objects.
Ontological Dependence and the Debate between
Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism
2In several places, Pag e seems to limit his unqualified use of “realism”and
“antirealism” to views that focus on the question of whether or not the entire
natural world is mind-dependent. (See especially Page, 2006: p. 321). How-
ever, throughout the article, he considers other versions of realism and anti-
realism some of which are more global in nature and some of which are
more restricted.
3My reasons for so doing will become clearer below. Here let me say that, i
f
it turns out (as Page suggests) that Putnam, Rorty, and/or Goodman would
accept metaphysical realism in my sense, I would be content. However, I
seriously doubt that there are none but strawmen who would be inclined to
deny theses 1) and/or 2) of metaphysical realism .
4More precisely, ontological dependence (rather than causal, structural or
individuative dependence) seems to be the notion of mind-dependence
central to thesis a) of the version of metaphysical realism that I have de-
fended: the world does not depend on the existence or activities of minds for
its onto lo gical s tat us . St ru ctur al d epen den ce i s more clear ly at i ss ue i n t hes is
b) of metaphysical realism: that the world has some structure that is mind-
independent.
Of the four types of mind-dependence Page identifies, onto-
logical dependence seems to most closely approximate the sort
I take to be germane to the debate between metaphysical real-
ists and antirealists.4 Page too is initially inclined to give a
counter-factual analysis of the concept of ontological depend-
ence: “Something is ontologically dependent on us if our ceas-
ing to exist would immediately cause it to cease to exist” (Page,
2006: p. 322). As before, the counter-factual analysis serves to
masks the ambiguity in and seemingly renders trivial the claim
that minds themselves are ontologically dependent. However,
Page goes on to examine putative examples of objects that are
ontologically dependent (money, national borders, tax laws, and
other “social realities”) as well as putative examples of objects

D. C. SMITH
that are ontologically independent (mountains, rocks and other
“brute physical realities”). In doing so, he is able to articulate a
significant way in which an object (or kind of object) might be
ontologically dependent on minds:
Things like money, national borders, tax laws, and speed
limits—which are sometimes called social realities—are onto-
logically dependent on people, since if all people went out of
existence, they would immediately follow. Their very being is
generated and sustained by our collective agreement and social
practices (Page, 2006: p. 322).
Engaging in various social practices (including the practice
of agreeing or disagreeing) is clearly something that we do qua
creatures with minds. So, anything that is generated by and
depends for its continued existence upon our engaging in vari-
ous social practices is clearly mind-dependent in a significant
way.
While, I’m inclined to agree that money, national borders,
tax laws, and speed limits are ontologically dependent for the
reason Page cites, I think that his focus on social realities sug-
gests too narrow a scope for the concept of ontological de-
pendence, at least if that concept is to be at all relevant to the
debate between metaphysical realists and anti-realists. To use a
now familiar example, it seems to me that the stripes in a rain-
bow (if not the rainbow itself5) are generated by and depend for
their continued existence upon on minds. If humans (and other
species of animals) were to cease to exist, sunlight would no
doubt continue to refract in moisture laden air, but rainbows (if
they continued to exist at all) would no longer have stripes.6
For this reason, I’m inclined to say that the stripes of a rainbow
are ontologically dependent. However, what generates and
sustains the stripes of a rainbow is not our collective agreement
and social practices. Instead, the stripes of a rainbow are gener-
ated and sustained (at least in part) by our perceptual apparatus.
Perceiving—at least if that is to include the conscious experi-
ence of what is perceived—is again something we do qua crea-
tures with minds. So again, anything that is generated by and
depends for its continued existence upon our perceptual appa-
ratuses or the perceptual apparatuses of other animals is sig-
nificantly mind-dependent.
Just as it is plausible to suggest that mountains and rocks
(and moisture laden air) are not generated by nor do they de-
pend on our social practices, it is plausible to suggest that
mountains and rocks are not generated by nor do they depend
on our perceptual apparatuses. They are ontologically inde-
pendent in both respects. The central argument of “Meta-
physical Antirealism and Objective Truth” is that, whatever is
true of money or the stripes of a rainbow, minds cannot be on-
tologically dependent in either way. If there were no minds,
there would be no social practices to generate or sustain minds
in the way that money or national borders are generated and
sustained. If there were no minds, there would be no con-
scious perceivers to generate or sustain minds in the way the
stripes of a rainbow are generated and sustained. The chal-
lenge to the metaphysical antirealist that I presented in “Meta-
physical Antirealism and Objective Truth” is to more fully
articulate the ways in which something might be ontologically
dependent on minds and to identify a way in which it is coher-
ent to suppose that minds themselves might be ontologically
dependent on minds.
Page is inclined to disagree with my claim that ontological
dependence is what is at stake in contemporary metaphysical
realism/antirealism debates.
Radical Idealism is an apt name for the thesis that all reality
is ontologically dependent on us-that if all people ceased to
exist, everything else would consequently cease to exist. Few if
any academic philosophers, with the notable exception of
Berkeley, defend or are alleged to defend something akin to this
view (Page, 2006: p. 323).
He is no doubt correct that contemporary metaphysical anti-
realists are disinclined to share the view of Berkeley or of nine-
teenth-century absolute idealists. What is less clear is whether
what they do have to say entails some other form of global
ontological dependence. To answer that question, we must get
clearer about the notion of ontological dependence and the
entailment relations in which it stands to other forms of mind-
dependence.
Causal Dependence and the Debate between
Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism
While Page himself has little more to say about ontological
dependence, the concept is perhaps more clearly articulated by
way of contrast with his notions of causal, structural, and indi-
viduative dependence. Page again initially defines causal de-
pendence counter-factually but follows up with a hint of a
non-counter-factual account in terms of our making various
things or causing them to exist. “If people had never existed,
then physical things like baseballs, skyscrapers, and lamps
would never have existed, since we make these things. Such
manufactured realties are causally dependent on us, since we
caused them to exist” (Page, 2006: p. 323). Despite the fact that
baseballs and skyscrapers are causally dependent on us, Page
notes that they are plausibly taken to be ontologically inde-
pendent of us. Whatever our hand in generating these objects,
we do not appear to sustain them in any relevant sense (Though
of course we are capable of destroying them). This highlights
the fact that what is crucial to the concept of ontological de-
pendence is not that ontologically dependent objects are gener-
ated by us—this they share in common with causally dependent
objects. Rather, aspects of the world that are ontologically de-
pendent on us are, presumably unlike baseballs and skyscrapers,
inherently dependent on our existence and activities as crea-
tures with minds for their continued existence.
5Whether or not the rainbow itself is generated by and depends for its con-
tinued existence upon minds depends on whether we take rainbows to be
inherently striped objects. If we do, the rainbow itself is ontologically de-
pendent. If we take the inherently bowed structure but not the stripes to be
essential to a rainbow, the rainbow itself is plausibly taken to be ontology-
cally independent. Black and white photographs are able to capture the
illuminated arc of a rainbow (though not the stripes) and presumably would
continue to do so if humans suddenly ceased to exist.
6This is analogous to Page’s claim about social realities. Claiming that social
realities are generated and sustained by our social practices “is not to say
that the physical things that get counted as money and national borders, for
instance, would go out of existence if all people did, but just that those
physical things would no longer count as money or national borders” (Page,
2006: p. 322).
Since it is not incoherent to suppose that objects such as
baseballs, while causally dependent on us, are ontologically
independent of us, it seems clear that causal dependence does
not entail ontological dependence. But what of the converse?
Page himself claims that “[i]t is presumably the case that all
things that are causally independent of us are ontologically
independent as well” (Page, 2006: p. 323). But of course, for
this claim to hold, its contrapositive must also hold: all things
40

D. C. SMITH
that are ontologically dependent on us are causally dependent
on us. Whether or not that is the case depends on how broadly
we construe causal dependence.
While even a minimally adequate exploration of the notion
of causality is well beyond the scope of this discussion, I think
it is safe to say that causality is generally construed as a relation
between events or types of events. In what follows, I will
largely remain neutral concerning what sort of relation between
events constitutes a causal relation. I will instead explore dif-
ferent ways of construing causal dependence that differ with
respect to what kinds of events are taken to be possible relata of
the causal relation. The paradigm instances of causal relata are
purely physical events: events involving only physical realities.
Here I want to construe “physical reality” fairly broadly to in-
clude both the realities postulated by our best scientific theories
(such as electrons and quarks, but also molecules, proteins,
chromosomes, etc.), as well as macro-physical objects (such as
mountains, stars, baseballs, and skyscrapers) recognized by
commonsense.
One way of construing the notion of causation is to hold that
physical events exhaust the field of the causal relation. On such
a view, mental events are able to stand in causal relations (ei-
ther as cause or effect) only if mental events are a subset of
physical events. On this construal of causation, if mental events
are not physical events, there is no sense of “mind-dependence”
that genuinely involves causation. However, we have already
seen that ontological dependence is a significant sense of
“mind-dependence”. So, if physical events exhaust the field of
the causal relation and mental events are not a subset of the
physical events, then it follows (contra Page) that ontological
dependence does not entail causal dependence. In the discus-
sion that follows, I will consider the case in which mental
events do constitute a (proper) subset of the physical events.
It is worth noting at this point that not every event that is
physically caused in whole or in part by us is caused by us qua
creatures with minds. The examples of causally dependent ob-
jects cited by Page (baseballs, skyscrapers, lamps) are impor-
tantly all e xamples of artifacts. Artifac ts are intentionally ma de
by us to serve some sort of purpose. Having intentions and
purposes are clearly things we do qua creatures with minds.
However, artifacts are only a proper subset of the things created
by us. As I walk outside on a sunny day, I cause a shadow to be
formed. As I live over time in my home, I create numerous dust
bunnies. But shadows and dust bunnies are not things that I
intentionally cause (indeed, I would prefer not to cause dust
bunnies). A creature otherwise like me but without a mind
would still cast shadows and cause dust bunnies as it moved
about its environment. These items would not seem to be
mind-dependent in any significant way.7
If causal dependence is to be taken as a species of mind-de-
pendence, then the notion of causal-dependence should not be
so broadly construed so as to include shadows and dust bunnies
as causally dependent realities. Were (purely physical) causal
dependence to be the sort of mind-dependence at issue in the
metaphysical realism/antirealism debate, it would follow (ab-
surdly) that the existence of dust bunnies constitutes a sufficient
reason for denying metaphysical antirealism. I submit that this
result gives us reason to agree with Page that causal depend-
ence construed in terms of purely physical causation is not
germane to the metaphysical debate (This result is not surprise-
ing. I am aware of no metaphysical antirealist who is inclined to
claim that the world and all of its structure is made by us in the
way we make baseballs or other artifacts). Given that ontology-
cal dependence is plausibly thought to be germane to the meta-
physical debate, we once again have reason to disagree with
Page that ontological dependence entails causal dependence.
But perhaps there is a role for causal dependence to play in
the debate between metaphysical realists and antirealists if we
construe causal dependence in such a way that the causal relata
are not explicitly limited to physical realities and explicitly
deny that mental events (at least the ones involved in causal
dependence) are a species of physical event. The problem that
we face in this case is that, divorced from the purely physical
setting at which it is most at home, the notion of causation and
with it the distinction between causal dependence and the other
varieties of mind-dependence identified by Page becomes quite
murky.
Structural Dependence and the Debate between
Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism
A third sense of “mind-independence” identified by Page is
what he calls “structural independence”.
Something is structurally independent of us if it has a struc-
ture independent of how we say it is structured. Mountains are
structured independent of us, since they would have many of
the physical features and characteristics they do had we never
existed (Page, 2006: p. 325).
At first blush, it might seem as if Page would want to cite
objects that are causally dependent on us as examples of objects
that are structurally dependent. After all, baseballs would not
have had the physical features and characteristics that they do
had we never existed. Further, the structure of a baseball very
much depends on how those who make up the rules of baseball
say a baseball is to be structured. However, once created, base-
balls (like mountains) have a structure that is quite independent
of what we believe or say about how they are structured. In-
stead, Page states that “Something would be structurally de-
pendent on us if it were totally amorphous and we (somehow)
imposed all structure onto it” (Page, 2006: p. 325).
Initially, Page cites clouds as possible examples of items that
are structurally dependent since they are somewhat amorphous
and it is we who see familiar shapes and patterns in them (Page,
2006: pp. 325-326). However, he is quick to point out that
clouds are not really good examples of structurally dependent
objects since they do have an independent structure.
7It is also worth noting that not ever y object we cause t o exist qu a creatures
with minds is properly thought of as an artifact. While money, time zones,
and other social realities may well be something that we intentionally create
to serve a purpose, I am somewhat disinclined to call them artifacts.
Moreover, the stripes of a rainbow are not (generally) created intentionally
by us to serve any purpose. We simply find ourselves perceiving the stripes
of a rain bow at cert ain times i n cer tai n l ocat io ns at leas t p rima f aci e in much
the same way we find ourselves perceiving mountains and rocks.While
there is some sense in which we cause the stripes of a rainbow to exist (our
p
erceptual apparatuses are a significant part of the causal explanation), the
rainbow’s stri
p
es are clearl
y
not artifacts.
Clouds, for instance, are comprised of certain molecules and
have properties independent of what we think and say about
them. It is likely that there are no natural realities that are com-
pletely structurally dependent on us… (Page, 2006: p. 326).
To be genuinely structurally dependent, an object would
have to be totally amorphous so to speak all the way down so
that it was we who imposed any and all structure on the object.
Structural dependence is the sort of mind-dependence I had

D. C. SMITH
in mind when formulating thesis b) of metaphysical realism:
that the world has some structure(s) this is(are) mind-inde-
pendent (Smith, 1999: p. 411). Given that I took metaphysical
realism to be the conjunction of two theses, any view that de-
nied thesis b) alone would count as a version of metaphysical
antirealism. However, as I noted in “Metaphysical Antirealism
and Objective Truth” (Smith, 1999: p. 414), it is far from clear
that the notion that something could have independent onto-
logical status but be totally amorphous is even coherent. Page
himself notes that even if reality were “at base a fluid, undif-
ferentiated continuum,” it would still be structurally independ-
ent of us (Page, 2006: p. 328). It seems far more probable that,
if anything is structurally dependent on us, that is due to the
fact that it is ontologically dependent on us.
The example of a rainbow’s stripes is again instructive here.
A rainbow has a definite stripy structure that is imposed on
reality by our perceptual mechanisms. However, it isn’t as if the
rainbow exists with a totally amorphous structure prior to our
imposition of stripes onto it. Rather, our perceptual mecha-
nisms interacting with an external portion of the world that
presumably has independent structure give rise to the stripes of
the rainbow. I believe that similar things could be said about the
structure of time zones, money, and other social realities that
are ontologically dependent on us. This suggests that structural
dependence entails ontological dependence. Since it is difficult
to see how something could have any independent structure at
all were it to lack independent ontological status, I would sug-
gest that something is structurally dependant if and only if it is
ontologically dependent.
In rejecting structural dependence as relevant to the meta-
physical realism/antirealism debate, Page does not seem to
consider the possibility that it might stand or fall with onto-
logical dependence.8 He seems only to consider the possibility
that there would be some aspect of reality that has independent
ontological status but which is amorphous and onto which we
impose all structure. Whether or not structural dependence (and
with it ontological dependence) is germane to the metaphysical
debate will depend heavily on its relation to the type of mind-
independence Page does take to be relevant: individuative de-
pendence.
Individuative Dependence and the Debate
between Metaphysical Realism and Antirealism
The final sense of “mind-independence” described by Page
(and, according to him, the most relevant to the contemporary
realism/antirealism debate) is individuative independence. “To
say that the natural world is individuatively independent of us
is to say that it is divided up into individual things and kinds of
things that are circumscribed by boundaries that are totally
independent of where we draw the lines” (Page, 2006: p. 327).
While the question of whether or not there are real kinds inde-
pendent of us is the heart of the historical debate between sortal
realists and nominalists, it is (or so it seems to me) of dubious
relevance to the contemporary debates between metaphysical
realists and antirealists. As such, I will focus exclusively on the
element of individuative dependence/independence that in-
volves the individuation of the world into discrete things. As
examples of objects that are plausibly taken to be indivi-
duatively independent of us, Page cites the moon, individual
apples, grizzly bears, and pearls. As prime examples of things
that are individuatively dependent on us, Page cites individual
constellations.
We individuate the night sky into constellations. We, or more
specifically our ancestors, determined which stars comprise
which constellations. We can come up with new constellations
whenever we like simply by pointing out a few stars and giving
the cluster a name. Furthermore, the boundary between a con-
stellation and its surroundings is very much a function of where
we draw the lines (or more aptly, how we connect the dots)
(Page, 2006: p. 328).
While reality may be divided up into individual heavenly
bodies independently of us, it is we who select certain stars and
not others as belonging to a given constellation. We could chop
up the visible objects in the night sky into constellations in any
number of ways. No one of these divisions into constellations
would better carve reality at its joints than any other.
It is worth noting that what goes for constellations also goes
for national borders, time zones, and many (though perhaps not
all) other social realities. There are facts about the existence
and structure of the continental land mass of North America
that are (plausibly) independent of us. Given our various inter-
ests in having nations and keeping time, we chop up the land
mass into individual nations and individual time zones. We
could have chopped up the land mass into nations and time
zones in any number of ways. Some might have been more or
less convenient. Some might have made strategic use of natural
features (such as mountains or rivers). But to a great extent,
none of them would better reflect any true national or time-zone
like joints in any reality that is independent of us. I would sub-
mit that constellations, like nations and time zones, are among
the social realities that are ontologically dependent on us. If
humans were to wink out of existence, the heavenly bodies
would still be arranged in the sky in a certain fashion, but con-
stellations would cease to exist.
Interestingly, Page is inclined to take rainbows (or at least
their stripes) to be further examples of things that are indi-
viduatively dependent on us. “Though it may appear that there
is a finite number of colour stripes in a rainbow, in reality a
rainbow is a smooth spectrum that can be divided into as many
stripes as we like” (Page, 2006: p. 328). Whether or not there is
a sense in which rainbows or their stripes are individuatively
dependent on us, I think it is a mistake to suggest that the
stripes of a rainbow are individuatively dependent on us in the
way in which constellations are. In the case of constellations,
we perceive an arrangement of heavenly bodies in the sky and
then group these heavenly bodies in various ways thereby indi-
viduating constellations. This is not what is going on in the
individuation of the stripes of a rainbow. Whether or not it is
true to say that “in reality a rainbow is a smooth spectrum”, it is
certainly not the case that we consciously perceive rainbows as
a smooth spectrum and only then chop them into stripes. We
consciously perceive the rainbow and its stripes simultaneously.
Unlike the case of the night sky and constellations, we are not
free to chop up the rainbow into stripes in any number of ways.
Instead, our perceptual mechanisms do the chopping prior to
the conscious experience of the rainbow. If the stripes in a
rainbow are examples of individuatively dependent objects,
they depend for their individuation on us in a very different
way than do constellations, time zones, or national borders. In
8Though to be sure he does suggest, contrary to what I want to maintain, that
ontological dependence is not relevant to the contemporary metaphysical
realism debate when he notes that few if any contemporary philosophers
would be willing to accept radical idealism. (See Page, 2006: p. 323).
42

D. C. SMITH
fact, the distinction between the way in which the stripes of a
rainbow are individuated by us and the ways in which constel-
lations, time zones, and national borders are individuated by us
perfectly parallels the distinction noted above between these
objects taken as ont o l o g ic a l ly dependent.
It is difficult to imagine how something could, quite inde-
pendent of us, be an individual thing when it depends on us for
its ontological status. The very idea of something individuatively
independent but ontologically dependent would seem to be
incoherent. I would submit that individuative independence
entails ontological independence. But what about the reverse?
Despite the variety of ways in which an object can be indi-
viduatively dependent on us, the plausible examples of indi-
viduatively dependent objects have all turned out to be onto-
logically dependent on us (though in different ways). It is thus
tempting to conclude that individuative dependence entails
ontological dependence. If this is correct, the set of objects that
are individuatively dependent is coextensive with the set of
objects that are ontologically dependent (and hence with the set
of objects that are structurally dependent). It would appear that
Page has too hastily dismissed the notions of ontological and
structural dependence as irrelevant to the metaphysical real-
ism/antirealism deba te.
But what are we to make of Page’s explicit denial that indi-
viduative dependence entails structural dependence (Page, 2006:
p. 332)?
If something is individuatively dependent on us, it does not
follow that it is structurally dependent on us as well. Moun-
tain peaks, for example, are individuatively dependent on us,
since the number of peaks in a given mountain range depends
on how “peak” is defined. …Of course, it would be absurd to
think that the peaks are also structurally dependent on us, that
we somehow structure the peaks through some mysterious cog-
nitive faculty (Page, 2006: pp. 332-333).9
The answer lies in noting an important ambiguity in the no-
tion of individuation. On one sense of “individuation”, indi-
viduation is a metaphysical/ontological notion. Something is
individuated in this sense if it exists or otherwise has ontology-
cal status as an individual (This is the sense in which I have
been using “individuation” above in arguing that ontological
dependence and individuative dependence are coextensive no-
tions). Let us call this sense “metaphysical individuation”. On
another sense of “individuation”, individuation is an epistemic
and/or linguistic notion. Something is individuated in this sense
if it is singled out for reference by having a singular term or
definite description applied to it. Let us call this sense “linguis-
tic individuation”.
As I want to use the term, “linguistic individuation” is a suc-
cess term. Nothing can be linguistically individuated if there is
no object that is metaphysically individuated (whether depen-
dently on or independently of us) to serve as the referent of the
term or definite description (I make no presumption that any
definite description used to linguistically individuate an object
accurately describes the object. It is sufficient that the descrip-
tion allows for successful reference to the object). While lin-
guistic individuation entails metaphysical individuation, the
reverse is not the case. No doubt, there are many objects that
are metaphysically individuated that have not been and likely
never will be linguistically individuated by us. Plausible exam-
ples include individual rocks on the far side of the moon, most
individual examples of extinct species, most individual hydro-
gen molecules, and the individual sub-portions of the surface of
the Earth that might have been but were not in fact picked out
as time zones.
With the distinction between metaphysical individuation and
linguistic individuation in mind, let us return to Page’s example
of mountain peaks. Consider a portion of a mountain range that
includes a summit and surrounding saddles such that the sum-
mit rises 150 feet above its highest surrounding saddle. Call this
portion “Mt. X”. Let us first suppose that Page’s claim is
merely that Mt. X can have an independent structure while
being dependent on us for its being accurately linguistically
individuated as a peak. I would submit that this is not a claim
that has any bearing on the debate between metaphysical real-
ists and antirealists. Of course it is true that whether or not “be-
ing an individual peak” can accurately be predicated of Mt. X
depends on our linguistic conventions (as does its being called
“Mt. X”). Whether or not Mt. X is a peak depends upon how
we define ‘peak’. If we require that a peak be 200 feet higher
than any saddle surrounding it, then Mt. X is not a peak. If we
allow any summit that is 100 feet or higher than any saddle
surrounding it to count as a peak, then Mt. X is a peak. I would
be surprised if any philosopher had ever wanted to claim that
whether or not a linguistic item is accurately predicated of an
individual is something that is independent of us and our use of
language. In any case, this is certainly not something that the
metaphysical realist must ma i ntain.
However, the question of whether or not “peak” is accurately
predicated of Mt. X is a distinct question from whether its
metaphysical individuation is in any way dependent on us. If
we suppose (as is plausible) that Mt. X is not dependent on us
for its metaphysical individuation (i.e., that there would have
been a summit in this range rising 150 feet above its highest
surrounding saddle even if humans had never existed), it is
natural to suppose that Mt. X is structurally independent of us.
But this is not a case in which we have a structurally independ-
ent object that is metaphysically individuatively dependent on
us. If we suppose along with the metaphysical antirealist that
Mt. X is dependent on us for its metaphysical individuation,
then, barring an account of how an object can have any struc-
ture at all if it lacks ontological status, it is not plausible to
agree with Page that its structure is independent of us. I would
submit that metaphysical individuative dependence, which is
the sort of individuative dependence germane to the meta-
physical realism/antirealism debate, stands or falls with struc-
tural dependence.
Conclusion
In summary, there is reason to believe that ontological de-
pendence, structural dependence, and the only sort of indi-
viduative dependence that is relevant to the metaphysical de-
bate are all coextensive notions. As such, any argument that
succeeds in establishing that it is incoherent to suppose that
everything is ontologically and/or structurally dependent th ereb y
establishes the incoherence of metaphysical antirealism. To
resist this conclusion the metaphysical antirealist has limited
9It is worth noting that a similar claim could be made about the structure o
f
time zones, which are plausibly taken to be ontologically dependent on us.
The number of time zones depends upon how we chopped the surface of the
Earth int o ti me zones . Howev er, on ce th e surf ace of t he Ea rth i s chop ped u p
into ti me zones, we can con sider the st ructur e of the p art that co nsti tutes th e
Pacific time zone. This portion of the surface of the earth would seem to
have at least most of its structure (if not its defining borders) quite inde-
pendent of us. I believe that what I have to say in response to Page’s exam-
ple of mountain peaks will apply mutatis mutandis to time zones.

D. C. SMITH
44
options: 1) provide an account of how one and the same thing
could be dependent on us for its ontological status as an indi-
vidual without being dependent on us more generally for its
ontological status (thereby rejecting the entailment between
metaphysical individuative dependence and ontological de-
pendence), 2) provide an account of how one and the same
thing could be dependent on us for its ontological status as an
individual without being dependent on us for its structure
(thereby rejecting the entailment between metaphysical indi-
viduative dependence and structural dependence), or 3) tackle
the arguments that appear to establish the incoherence of global
ontological or global structural dependence head on. In any
case, it would appear that the metaphysical antirealist has a
significant explanatory burden to meet if he is to defend the
viability of his view.
REFERENCES
Page, S. (2006). Mind-independence disambiguated: Separating the
meat from the straw in the realism/anti-realism debate. Ratio, 19,
321-335. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00330.x
Smith, D. C. (1999). Metaphysical antirealism and objective truth: Is
metaphysical antirealism self-refuting? The Southern Journal of Phi-
losophy, 37, 293-313. doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.1999.tb00869.x