Pretense Theory and the Imported Background ()
Abstract
Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument–one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions–for the falsity of the pretense theory.
Share and Cite:
Goodman, J. (2011) Pretense Theory and the Imported Background.
Open Journal of Philosophy,
1, 22-25. doi:
10.4236/ojpp.2011.11004.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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